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Abstract: State-owned enterprises are considered an important phenomenon in the 
contemporary international business research which has a particular focus on the 
internationalization of such companies. The most prominent examples of globalizing state 
companies are the enterprises from emerging markets, whose economies are traditionally 
shaped a lot by the state influence and where historical legacy still influences the development 
of economy. This study examines the relationship of the state ownership and 
internationalization which is still far from being clear, since research on this topic produced 
controversial results. The controversy may be grounded in the different contexts where state 
companies operate. We study the Russian state companies, that are the least studied among 
the emerging market countries, and promise to reveal the insights on the internationalization 
strategies of SOEs. We examine the association of the state ownership degree and the 
internationalization level on the sample of state- and private-owned enterprises that are the 
250 largest Russian exporters for the 4 years from 2013 to 2016. The results indicate that state 
ownership degree is negatively associated with the internationalization intensity, but only in 
case of the indirect state ownership, which we explain with the argumentation of the public 
agenda that companies pursue indirectly. Russian state companies are considered to have both 
commercial and strategic goals, and the latter may be connected to the geopolitical aspirations 
of the government. Firms with indirect state affiliation are used by the government as a 
leverage to reach non-market goals. Thus, the state pursues strategic (as opposed to 
commercial) agenda indirectly.  
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Background and motivation 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are considered an important phenomenon in the 
contemporary international business research with approximately 10% of world GDP that 
they generate, according to the data of OECD in 2016, and it evokes a rising interest from the 
scholars worldwide. One of the indicators of such an interest is the special issue of the Journal 
of International Business Studies (2014), the flagship of international business research. The 
special issue focused on the phenomenon of the globalization of state-owned multinational 
companies (SOMNC) and on the diverse approaches of the state towards internationalization 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al, 2014). 
SOEs are manifested in a state capitalism, a phenomenon that is claimed to contest 
traditional market economy. This influential market constellation is the type of market 
economy where state has a dominant role in economy and pursues political goals (Bremmer, 
2009). Researchers have largely predicted that SOEs are destined to disappear as a result of 
pro-market reforms yet in the 1980s but despite these predictions, state capitalism is believed 
to be reviving (Benito et al., 2016). Moreover, global financial turmoil made governments 
worldwide obtain ownership of previously private businesses (Shi et al., 2016). 
In comparison to private-owned enterprises (POEs), SOEs have other incentives to 
exist, apart from the maximization of profit as POEs. There is a certain bias against SOEs in 
the Western research, as SOEs are seen as a basis of communist ideology which results in the 
debate capitalism vs. communism, and state enterprises seem not to be incorporated in the 
mainstream theory of a firm (Bruton et al., 2015). Estrin and his colleagues (2012) argue that 
the state ownership is a rare case in market economy while private ownership is dominating, 
thus SOEs are seen as somewhat marginal and relict form. 
Many SOEs had to dramatically change their face in terms of the degree of state 
involvement in management and in terms of the scale of its activities, so that they became a 
mixture of state and private ownership, together with widening the horizons of their operation 
to overseas (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2012). These transformations followed after the 
1980s wave of pro-market reforms and fall of the communist regimes (Bruton et al., 
2015).This was reinforced by globalization processes which resulted in reduced trade and 
investment barriers together with advanced transportation and progress in communication 
technologies. All this facilitated transformation of state-owned companies into state-owned 
MNCs (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). 
Thus, companies with the state ownership go on successfully expanding 
internationally. Figures from the Investment Report of the UNCTAD (2014) demonstrate that 
among all MNCs state-owned enterprises constitute a small part but the number of their 
foreign affiliates and the scale of their foreign assets are significant. UNCTAD estimates that 
there are at least 550 SOMNCs, with more than $2 trillion of foreign assets and 11% of the 
FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2014). Globalization of the state companies makes researchers 
reassess the traditional theories of firm, as they do not equip scholars with the necessary tools 
to examine SOEs. Some scholars even argue that there is a necessity to develop a distinct 
theory of state companies, so different they are from private firms, but still play an important 
role in the global economy (Peng et al., 2016). 
The most prominent examples of state companies that engage in international 
operations are represented by emerging markets, whose economies are traditionally shaped a 
lot by the state influence and where historical legacy still influences the development of 
economy. Overall, a half of the multinational SOEs are headquartered in emerging economies 
(World Investment Report UNCTAD, 2017). They have common characteristics but also 
distinct special features in terms of their internationalization strategies and paths (Michailova, 
Zubkovskaya, 2014). 
Relationship of state ownership and internationalization received a lot of scholarly 
attention in various concerns (Ciu, Jiang, 2012; Estrin et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2015; Bass, 
Chakrabarty, 2014; Huang et al., 2017 and many others). The way how state ownership is 
associated with the willingness and  ability of SOEs to internationalize and consequently 
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influence performance largely depends on the contexts they are embedded in (Hennart et al., 
2017). Research on the internationalizing SOEs has a distinctive bias towards China, and in 
order to overcome this one-sided perspective we need to examine other big emerging 
economies and their internationalizing SOEs. Researchers examined the globalizing SOEs 
from almost all largest emerging markets: China (Cui, Liang, 2012), Brazil (Musacchio, 
Lazzarini, 2014), India (Choudhury, Khanna, 2014), but Russia remains somewhat in shadow, 
despite the fact that Russian state companies go overseas actively. 
All in all, the research on the internationalizing SOEs produced contradictory results. 
According to the study of Hennart and his colleagues (2017), who focused on the Brazilian 
context, the intensity of internationalization is positively influenced by the degree of the state 
ownership in companies. This positive association contradicts the findings Huang and the co-
authors (2017) who studied the case of Chinese companies and found out that the high 
percentage of state-owned shares exerts negative effects on SOEs’ OFDI. In order to clarify 
the relationship between state ownership and internationalization, we should consider other 
emerging economies and their internationalizing SOEs where Russia offers a prospective 
laboratory for the research. Russian state companies promise to reveal the insights on the 
internationalization strategies of SOEs that experience unique situation: they face the external 
geopolitical pressures such as sanctions imposed on the state companies, and they therefore 
have to adjust the strategies of internationalization to them. Examining the 
internationalization strategies of the Russian SOEs therefore aims to advance knowledge on 
the influence of state ownership on internationalization which still remains ambiguous 
(Bruton et al., 2015). 
Russian context is very prospective for the purposes of our research, as it offers a good 
laboratory to study the the state companies that expand internationally. The reason is that 
SOEs are among the largest enterprises of the country (Expert 400, 2016), while according to 
Fortune Global 500, 4 of 5 Russian enterprises presented there are state-owned: Gazprom 
(56), Rosneft (118), Sberbank (199), and VTB Bank (478). Moreover, and among all M&A 
deals of Russian MNCs in 2014 approximately 50% were deals with state companies 
(according to the data from Zephyr database of M&A). Therefore, in terms of 
internationalization SOEs are very present on the Russian and hence on the global market. 
State-owned enterprises are defined differently in the scientific literature. Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. (2014) describe them as legally independent companies with direct state 
ownership. This definition may limit them to the firms exclusively to those ones where the 
government has a direct share. These scholars mention that IB literature tends to represent 
state and private companies as antagonists who have conflicting agendas, which is in fact the 
result of such an oppositional definition. There have been then attempts made to dive deeper 
into this definition to examine the multifaceted nature of state-owned companies. Bruton et al. 
(2015) suggest to overcome the dichotomy of solely state vs. private enterprises, and extend 
the understanding of SOEs by defining them as hybrid firms with various levels of ownership 
and control of the state (as did Diefenbach, Sillince, 2011; Inoue, Lazzarini, Musacchio, 
2013). In this study we examine not only firms that are directly owned by the state, but also 
companies that have indirect ownership by the state via state agencies (Ciu,Jiang, 2012). 
 
State ownership and internationalization 
The relationship of the state ownership and internationalization is theoretically 
elaborated in various theories that examine the way state companies go overseas. Basically, 
all theories answer the question: how state ownership influences internationalization, 
encourages or hinders it, in other words, how this specific nature of state companies is 
reflected in the internationalization path and strategy of enterprises. 
Neo-institutional economics studies SOEs in a conjunction with the institutions of both 
home- and host-countries that are claimed to influence companies in their international 
expansion. First, institutions of home and host markets are examined in a way that they 
influence state companies once they internationalize. The impact of institutions demonstrates 
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itself in questions of the very motivation of SOEs to go global (Witt and Lewin, 2007), entry 
mode choice (Brouthers, 2002; Chan, Makino, 2007; Meyer, Estrin, et al., 2009), choice of 
destination, organizational form to exist in a host country, and institutional pressures that arise 
once SOEs decide to expand overseas (Kostova et al., 2008). The question of SOEs’ 
legitimacy is in the centre of neo-institutional theory (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014), which 
problematizes the possible conflict of the host and home country institutions (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999). To put it simply, neoinstitutional economics posits that companies (should) 
consider institutions in home and host countries as they shape the strategies of 
internationalization and affect the way a firm performs at a foreign market. 
Meyer and his co-authors (2014) argue that because of the specific status that SOEs 
have as dual agents of economic and political nature with perceived unfair advantages that 
state ownership provides and possible political agenda, and because of the historical loading, 
they face additional institutional pressures abroad. These pressures are particularly strong in 
the countries where normative control is high and where the market regulates itself with the 
minimal involvement of the state regulation mechanisms. Thus, institutions represented by 
various local actors of a host country, illuminate the difference that state companies have as 
opposed to private ones. The authors claim that institutional constellation of the host economy 
is a key determinant in terms of the entry mode choice, and in order to soften the institutional 
pressures, SOEs adapt their strategies to the host markets to enhance their legitimacy. The 
adaptation is manifested in entry mode they choose and control decisions they execute. 
The choice of the entry mode as an legitimacy building instrument often means that 
SOEs engage in alliances with local firms to exercise isomorphic practices or with both 
private and state host-country firms. SOEs may also rely intensively on the corporate social 
responsibility activities in order to enhance legitimacy among the local stakeholders (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2014).  
Institutional theory examines the phenomenon of SOEs’ internationalization, taking 
into account the political perspective as well, since the influence of institutions is often 
problematized with respect to politics and “governments as owners” (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2014), namely the extent of control the state executes over SOEs and possible political trade-
offs. Cui and Jiang (2012) study the effect of state ownership in FDI decisions in the 
conditions of institutional pressure and found out that state ownership creates political 
affiliation of state firms with their home-country government. Such affiliation influences the 
way SOEs take decisions concerning the entry mode in a particular way, namely the higher 
stake of government in a company positively moderates the effects of home regulatory, host 
regulatory and host normative pressures on a company to decide in favor of a joint ownership 
structure (Cui and Jiang, 2012). 
Transaction cost theory develops the owner-risk argument, that argues that the state 
ownership equips companies with different sense of risk-tolerance as opposed to the private 
companies, because of larger budgets and resources (Kaldor, 1980). As a result, SOEs may be 
more willing to undertake riskier investments and participate in riskier projects (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2014). Because of such an “airbag” SOEs tend to invest into less stable 
economies that potentially bear risks. Such distinct risk tolerance also results in SOEs more 
willing and able to choose in favour of more risky entry mode as OFDI through acquisitions 
and greenfield ventures (Ramasamy et al., 2012; Duanmu, 2014). The owner-risk argument is 
reflected as well in the SOEs less sensitive to the expropriation risk abroad as the 
governments in their home countries may use political power to negotiate conditions less 
favourable in terms of expropriation risk (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014), or neglect the threat 
of expropriation risk even if it is high, provided that a host country has a positive political 
relations with a home country (Duanmu, 2014). 
All in all, state companies are considered to see the transaction costs differently, and 
act differently.  High levels of government ownership make companies more tolerant to risk 
and view an investment at a lower transaction cost in comparison to the enterprises that have 
no or little government ownership. Apart from that, the institutional environments influence 
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subsidiary ownership in a way that it is negatively moderated by the level of government 
ownership of a firm and its level of legislative connections (Pan et al., 2014).  
The way state ownership influences internationalization is often examined by means of 
the agency theory and its variations. Agency theory states that because of agency conflict 
SOEs are typically less efficient, and thus less able to develop resources that will help them to 
compete abroad. Consequently, SOEs are considered to be less likely to internationalize. 
Estrin et al. (2012) find empirical support to this supposition but as well state that broader 
perspective is needed to grasp the diverse environment in which SOEs operate. And here a 
contradiction to other theories can be illuminated. According to the political economy and 
state capitalism paradigm, the degree of state ownership is positively associated with the 
internationalization level of SOEs. The evidence was found on the Brazilian context (Hennart, 
2017). Scholars that use resource-based view argue that the state shares have a negative effect 
on the OFDI of SOEs (Huang, 2017). This contradiction illustrates the ambiguity over the 
relationship of state ownership and internationalization that we seek to resolve by examining 
the internationalization of SOEs in Russia. 
 
SOEs in Russia 
Russian economy is characterized a lot by state influence and intervention: according to 
the 2016 Report of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, 70% of the economy of the country is 
controlled by the government via state companies, and this share has increased from 35% in 
2005 (Vedomosti, 2016).There is a current trend of further increase in state control over 
economy in the recent years. The government has played an active role in the emergence of 
the Russian multinational enterprises, and in outbound FDI from the country. Though the 
Russian economy is substantially shaped by the state, it does not automatically mean that 
international activities are dominated by SOEs. For example, the role of SOEs in the OFDI is 
quite large comparing with the economies of the developed countries, but still rather low in 
comparison with economies of other emerging markets, especially their flagship -  China 
(Kuznetsov, 2011). 
Researchers examined Russian SOEs with regards to their role in the economy 
(Radygin, 2015), their ownership structure (Abramov et al., 2017; Vernikov, 2010) but 
internationalization in particular, to the best of our knowledge, was not addressed by the 
scientific community, although the Russian state-owned companies are globally among the 
leading investors (Kuznetsov, 2013; Dikova et al., 2016). In top 20 largest Russian enterprises 
by the amount of foreign assets there are 6 companies that have various share of the state. 
Resource firms dominate the list, not only gas&oil and metals, traditionally leading export 
industries, but also chemical, electricity and service companies (Kuznetsov, 2013). 
Russian SOEs’ international activities received scant attention from scholars. The 
scarcity of research on the Russian SOEs’ internationalization may be explained by the lack 
of transparency that they demonstrate, which results in the missing data (Kuznetsov, 2011). 
Some state enterprises, such as state corporations, are legally in fact non-commercial 
organizations that were created to serve the public interest, they are hence free from the 
obligatory reports that commercial companies have to present.  
Russian SOEs enjoy administrative support, access to loans and resources (Panibratov, 
2013) which give them additional advantages in internationalization. In media in and outside 
Russia its state-owned companies are often seen as a vehicle to realize political goals of the 
government and secure national interests of the country. Researchers also argue that the state 
companies in Russia are widely considered to have both commercial and strategic reasoning 
while expanding overseas, and the extent of each remains unclear (Jirusek, Vicek, 2015). As a 
result, internationalization strategies are expected to be tightly interconnected with the foreign 
policy of the state (Vaahtra, Liuhto, 2004). 
These contextual specificities suggest considering the public agenda reasoning which 
argues that the Russian SOEs will pursue strategic, rather than commercial goals in their 
internationalization process. Taking into account the expected political agenda in the 
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internationalization strategies of the Russian state companies, we assume that the state 
ownership degree is negatively associated with the internationalization level, since the 
political reasoning leads companies to the overseas expanding that pursues strategic goals that 
are not necessarily correlated with the high internationalization intensity. Apart from that, 
because of the specific status that SOEs have as dual agents of economic and political nature 
with perceived unfair advantages that state ownership provides and possible political agenda, 
and because of the historical loading, they lack legitimacy (Meyer et al., 2014). As a result, 
they might face additional difficulties as they internationalize and end up less 
internationalized than private-owned companies. Thus the hypothesis: the degree of the state 
ownership of the Russian SOEs is negatively associated with the internationalization level. 
Hypothesis: state ownership of the Russian SOEs is negatively associated with the 
internationalization level. 
 
Method 
In order to examine the influence of state ownership on the internationalization degree 
of SOEs companies we ran Tobit regression analysis on the sample of 438 observations of the 
export activities of Russian companies. Tobit regression is used because the dependent 
variable - the degree of internationalization - is bound to 100 (Tobin, 1958). We used the list 
of the 250 largest Russian exporters for the years 2013-2016, published by the Expert Rating 
Agency. The list consists of the two parts: the major list of 200 largest Russian exporters on a 
federal level, and the second part, 50 companies, are taken from the list of the largest 
exporters of the Siberian region. The 200 of the companies constitute 80% of the overall 
volume of export in Russia. The choice of the sample is grounded in the lack of data on the 
internationalization activities of the Russian SOEs, and therefore, most firms in the list do not 
have a degree of state ownership. The final sample is the result of exclusion of the companies 
with missing data. 
Dependent variable: degree of internationalization 
To test the hypothesis we use the dependent variable of FSTS reflecting on the 
internationalization degree of companies. The degree of internationalization is measured as 
the ratio of the foreign sales to total sales (FSTS), the conventional indicator of the 
internationalization degree (Sullivan, 1994). We admit that there are limitations in such a 
method of measuring the internationalization degree, as it is reflected solely in the export 
activities of a firm but have to decide in favor of this measure because of the availability of 
data.  
Independent variables: direct and indirect state ownership degree 
The independent variables we use present the stake of the state in the ownership 
structure of firms. To measure it we use the  the percentage of direct and indirect state equity 
in the company (Abramov et al., 2017). The information is obtained from the databases, if not 
the case, we addressed the annual reports of companies. We divided the percentage of direct 
and indirect state ownership (the latter means the company is wholly or partially owned by 
the other company that is in turn owned by the state). 
Control variables 
To control for firm size we used company’s financial data, namely gross profit lag, to 
control for the experience of companies we used variable age (number of years since the 
foundation), to control for the location near the seaport we used a dummy variable (as a 
variable that may reflect the opportunities for a company to intervene in export activities), to 
control for industry we used dummy variables of industries (particularly OilGas industry). We 
also used political connections as a dummy variable to control for the political affiliations of 
the companies. The criterion to attribute a company political connection was the fact that its 
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executive board included politicians of any level: national, federal or municipal. This data 
was gathered manually from companies’ webpages, their annual reports and other documents.   
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
The most companies in the sample belong to traditional leading exporters - resource 
industries such as oil and gas, iron industry, chemicals and petrochem, precious gems, their 
overall share in the sample is 70,5%. They are followed by the machinery (12,5 %) - the 
major non-resource export industry (Expert 200, 2016), food industry (10,5%), construction 
materials firms (2,5%), tobacco companies (2%), printing industry (0,5%), multi-industry 
companies (1,5%). There are slight differences across the years in terms of the list of 
companies and the percentage of industries, and there is a trend observed of increase in the 
percentage of the non-resource export among the leading exporters (Expert 200, 2016). 
The list is dominated by the private companies (82%), and the share of the firms that 
have direct or indirect state ownership amounts to 18%. Nevertheless, taking into account that 
we have panel data, we believe the number of observations enables us to test the first 
hypothesis concerning the percentage of the state ownership and its influence on the 
internationalization intensity of companies. Following Hennart, we consider both companies 
with and without state equity relevant for the examination of the internationalization of the 
SOEs (Hennart et al., 2017). 
The half of the companies in the list are large (with on average 1000 - 5000 or more 
than 5000 employees), the other half consists of medium companies with 23% (250 - 1000 
employees), small companies with 27 % (up to 250 employees). The most companies were 
established more than 10 years ago:  39%  of firms are 10-20 years old, 34,5% - more than 21 
years old, the relatively new companies amount to 18,5% (6-10 years) and 8% - less than 5 
years. It is then obvious that a substantial part of the companies were established in the 1990s 
at the time when the Russian companies started opening up for the international markets. 
 
Preliminary results 
The table 1 demonstrates the results of the tobit panel regression run with STATA 
The random-effects tobit regression demonstrates that the model is significant, since the 
p-value is less than 0.05. State ownership direct is found insignificant, whereas indirect state 
ownership is significant (coefficient is 0.02) but negatively associated with the 
internationalization degree operationalized as FSTS. Political connections and age do not 
show significance as a control variable. Among the industry controls OilGas turned to be 
significant which is not surprising, taking into account the resource specifics of many 
countries in the sample. Thus, belonging to the oil and gas industry is proved to be positively 
associated with the internationalization degree of companies.  
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Table 1. 
 
Discussion and contribution 
Preliminary results show that the hypothesis is confirmed just for companies with 
indirect state ownership, so the state ownership degree is indeed negatively associated with 
internationalization level of state companies, but solely for those where state has indirect 
stake. It may mean that firms with indirect state affiliation are used by the government as a 
leverage to reach non-market goals. Thus, the state pursues strategic (as opposed to 
commercial) agenda indirectly. Apart from that the negative effect of state ownership on 
internationalization intensity may be explained by the following reasons: first, state ownership 
is often associated with insufficient level of competitiveness of its products, services or 
corporate management for competing on the internationals market; second, benefits that a 
company gets from the state participation in its ownership structure don’t create incentives for 
going and expanding abroad; third, state ownership makes companies vulnerable to 
international political crisis and sensitive to the foreign policy of a state. 
The results demonstrate positive association of the internationalization level to the oil 
and gas industry which is in line with the market-seeking motives of resource companies that 
are in pursuit of markets to sell their production. Company size is found to be negatively 
associated with the internationalization level, and this result may fit to the reasoning of the 
public (domestic) agenda of the state. It means that large companies are guided in their 
internationalization aspirations by the public agenda of the government. 
The limitation that we acknowledge with regards to the present study is that the 
dependent variable we use, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, fails to grasp the 
internationalization activities of state companies that happen outside the export entry mode. 
Thus, the activities of foreign subsidiaries of companies are not taken into account. One more 
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limitation is the small percentage of the state companies in the sample which is grounded in 
the lack of data on the internationalization of the Russian SOEs. Despite this limitations, 
potential theoretical contribution of this study lies in advancing knowledge on the interplay of 
the political and economic reasoning behind the internationalization strategies of SOEs which 
is far from being clear-cut. Further investigation should focus on finding out, how country 
context influences the relationship between state ownership and internationalization and why 
state companies in various contexts internationalize differently. Another prospective path for 
future research is to investigate other factors that influence internationalization strategies of 
the Russian SOEs. 
 
Conclusion 
This study aims to examine the way how state ownership influences 
internationalization of companies, using the evidence from the Russian context. State 
companies worldwide expand over their national borders and thus get over the traditional 
domestic focus. How exactly the state ownership is associated with the state ownership 
remains a question, for the prior research produced contradictory results in this concern. The 
ambiguity might well be grounded in the various country-contexts where state-owned 
enterprises are firmly embedded. Contextual differences are taken into account by scholars 
but there is still a lack of knowledge on how particularly the country context impacts the 
relationship of the state ownership and internationalization. 
The results of this study show that the state ownership, in line with our hypothesis, is 
negatively associated with the internationalization degree, but solely in case of the companies 
with the indirect ownership. It suggest using the argumentation of the public goals of SOEs 
that influence the agenda of the state companies and result in lesser degree of 
internationalization. The direct state ownership turns out to be negatively associated with the 
internationalization level  
The focus of this study is on the question how state ownership influences the 
internationalization of the Russian SOEs. It may seem yet another replication study in a 
different context, but our goal is broader, namely to contribute to the understanding of the 
internationalization of the state companies theoretically. Therefore, we strive to know not just 
how state ownership influences companies’ ability to internationalize, but why it happens the 
way it does. Further investigation will advance knowledge in this concern.  
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